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Abstract 
 
In the mid 1990s an extensive reform of the Swedish educational system took place in 
order to create a ‘school for everyone’ that was intended to function like a ‘social 
equalizer’. The new unified gymnasium initiated longer educational programs with an 
increased amount of civics courses. The aim of this study is to examine whether the 
well documented gap in levels of democratic citizenship characteristics between 
students on theoretical and vocational gymnasium study programs prevailed after this 
massive reform. Did the new educational system decrease the gap concerning political 
participation, knowledge, attentiveness and trust between students with different types 
of education? Given the vast amount of empirical research that has shown that 
education promotes democratic citizenship, the reform could be expected to result in a 
reduced civic gap. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in research on educational 
effects, results show no positive effects of initiating longer educational programs with 
more civic courses on the examined core dimensions of democratic citizenship. The 
gap in civic virtues between citizens from theoretical and vocational gymnasium 
study programs prevailed also after the unification of the educational system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Can a school reform that unifies the educational system by increasing the amount of 
civics courses and extending the length of educations reduce systematic inequalities 
in levels of democratic citizenship? Systematic differences related to type of 
education, first and foremost between theoretical and vocational gymnasium study 
programs, have been well known for several decades. The aim of this study is to 
examine whether the gap in levels of core dimensions of democratic citizenship pre-
vailed after the massive reform of the Swedish educational system that took place in 
the 1990s. More specifically, did the reform have any equalizing long-term effect on 
the gap between students from theoretical and vocational study programs concerning 
their levels of political participation, knowledge, attentiveness and trust? 
 This may at first glance seem to be a provincial matter. However, the reform of 
the Swedish gymnasium in the mid 1990s represents a unique opportunity to start dis-
entangle various effects of education on democratic citizenship among young 
citizens. By comparing young citizens’ scores on the indicators of democratic 
citizenship before and after the reform, we estimate the effect of raised educational 
levels. In extension, we investigate the potential of using school reform in order to 
balance systematic inequalities in levels of democratic citizenship among young 
citizens. 
 The educational system is often considered to be one of the primary arenas 
where young citizens’ political attitudes, knowledge and behavior are shaped. Schools 
are critical to the survival of democracy; this is where young people are supposed 
become democratic citizens. Great expectations are ascribed by theorists to the 
prospect of strengthening individual’s political knowledge, behavior and attitudes by 
a well functioning educational system (e.g. Galston 2001; Crittenden 2007; Gutman 
1999). Furthermore, it is also claimed that educational systems should “play a 
strategic role in promoting well-being, including fostering competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economies, as well as social cohesion and active citizenship” 
(Desjardins 2008, 24). The Swedish educational reform in the 1990s represent one of 
the most far-reaching attempts to unify a post-secondary school system; it aimed to 
provide everyone, regardless the choice of study program, with a high quality 
education that provides a solid ground for further academic studies.  
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 Although education is seen as “the prime factor in most analyses of political 
activity” (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 433), the relationship between 
education and democratic citizenship remain largely undertheorized. Orit Ichilov 
points out that “the causal connection between various processes of formal education 
and democratic citizenship is pretty much an undeciphered ‘black box’” (Ichilov 
2003, 418). In this article we aim to try to shed some light in this black box by 
disentangle the impact of type of education in relation to length of education and 
content of education. 
 In most studies of the relationship between education and democratic 
citizenship it is assumed that the length of education is an important determinant of 
various dimensions of democratic citizenship. Moreover, civic education research 
calls attention to the effects of curriculum, i.e. the content of education. While 
educational length and content are common explanatory factors in studies of 
educational effects, there are also other potential dimensions of education that may 
have impact on democratic citizenship. Therefore, we wish to underscore an 
important distinction between educational content, i.e. the actual courses taken on the 
one hand, and the type of education on the other. By type of education we mean the 
overall aim of the study program, to begin with if it is theoretical or vocational.1 In 
the current case we are interested in the potential impact of type of education in 
relation to content and length: Does the unequal levels of democratic citizenship 
characteristics between students with different types of education prevail when the 
length of study programs and the amount of civics courses have been increased? 
 In most countries, some kind of social studies courses is included in the 
curriculum of high status educational programs, whereas low status educations are 
shorter and focused on practical courses. Since the dimensions of education (length, 
content and type) often coincide as confounding factors it has hitherto been almost 
impossible – yet an important endeavor – to isolate the effects from one another. In 
this case however, we have the opportunity to isolate the impact of type of education 
from length and content. 
 
1 Even tough type of education and content of education content are overlapping concepts, we wish to 
make clear that they represent different dimensions of education which may have different causal 
effects. On the one hand, the content of education may have an impact on democratic citizenship since 
the courses studied may have positive effects on individuals’ civic skills. On the other hand, the type of 
education may, for example, have effects on the students’ future social network position, which in turn 
may have impact on their levels of political participation.  
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THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS 
Previous research ascribes great expectations to the prospect of strengthening 
individual’s political knowledge, behavior and attitudes by civics courses. Drawing 
on data from the 1980s, Westholm, Lindqvist and Niemi (1990) concluded that there 
was a gap between Swedish students on vocational and theoretical gymnasium 
programs concerning their political knowledge.2 However, their results indicated that 
a social studies curriculum had a positive effect on political literacy. Consequently, 
they argued that: “[the gap] is by no means a necessary outcome. […] Had all 
students been exposed to the same amount of training, we might well have seen a nar-
rowing of the gap between theoretical and vocational programs” (Westholm, 
Lindquist, and Niemi 1990, 200). This prediction represents the most common idea 
about how education affects democratic citizenship, what we here refer to as the 
absolute education effects model. We will test this model along with two other 
competing models – the sorting model and the pre-adult socialization model – which 
will be presented in the next sections.  
 
1) Why we have reason to expect that the reform will reduce the gap – The 
absolute education effects model 
Primarily, we will present the arguments that provide reasons to expect that the 
reform will decrease the gap in levels of democratic citizenship between students who 
went to vocational and theoretical gymnasium study programs. According to what we 
here refer to as the absolute education effects model, civic education is supposed to 
improve individuals’ political knowledge, political participation and democratic 
values such as tolerance.  
 The relationship between education and democratic citizenship is most often 
supposed to be explained through a cognitive pathway, i.e. what students learn in 
schools has positive effects on their behavior, knowledge and attitudes as a 
consequence of the fact that education improves the students’ cognitive skills. Walter 
and Rosenberger explains this possible effect of education in the following way: 
“Cognitively mobilized citizens are equipped with the main skills, resources and 
 
2 A more recent detailed account about the relationship between individuals with different types of 
education and political participation respectively value orientations can be found in Oscarsson and 
Holmberg (2004, 79) and Oscarsson (2003). 
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abilities necessary to process complex political information, to understand the rules 
and idiosyncrasies of the political system and to recognize their own political interests 
and preferences” (Walter and Rosenberger 2007, 11).  
 Drawing on previous research, we have reason to expect a general positive 
relationship between education and the core dimensions of democratic citizenship: 
political knowledge (Niemi and Junn 1998; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Finkel 
2003; Galston 2001; Mcallister 1998; Milner 2002; Milligan, Moretti, and 
Oreopoulos 2004), political participation (Dee 2004; Finkel 2003; Print 2007; Niemi 
and Junn 1998; Galston 2001; Nie and Hillygus 2001; Hillygus 2005; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995), trust (Helliwell and Putnam 2007; Rothstein 2001; 
Uslaner and Brown 2005; John and Morris 2004) democratic values such as tolerance 
(Slomcynski and Shabad 1998; Finkel and Ernst 2005) and political attentiveness 
(Ekman 2007; Denver and Hands 1990). Drawing on these studies, we derive the 
expectation that the gap between students on practical and vocational programs are 
decreasing after the reform as an effect of the extended length of vocational 
educations and the increased amount of civic education courses.  
 Moreover, of specific interest in relation to our case, scholars have recently 
argued that it is not education per se, but rather specific kinds of curriculum that 
promotes political participation (Hillygus 2005; Nie and Hillygus 2001; Niemi and 
Junn 1998). In these studies, a social science curriculum is shown to be especially 
effective to improve civic virtues. This gives us a twofold reason to expect that the 
reform had positive effects. Drawing on these studies it is reasonable to expect that 
not only the extension of educational length, but also the increase in the amount of 
civic courses given, will positively affect the indicators of democratic citizenship 
among these students.  
 
2) Why we have reason to expect that the reform will not reduce the gap - 
The pre-adult socialization model 
However, in the literature on educational effects, there is no agreement that education 
has absolute effects on individuals’ civic virtues in late adolescence. An implication 
of the well known pre-adult socialization model, is that education in late adolescence 
has no or very limited effects on levels of democratic citizenship since individuals’ 
political predispositions are already established when students enter upper secondary 
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schools (Sears and Funk 1999; Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz 1976; Alwin and 
Krosnick 1991; Hooghe and Wilkenfeld 2008; see also Sears and Levy for a research 
survey).3 Selection mechanisms in early adolescence have already shaped individuals 
choice of educational program; this means that civic education given to 17-19 year 
olds can not be expected to have any substantial effects on democratic citizenship 
(e.g. Cassel and Lo 1997; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Langton and Jennings 1968; 
Sears 1989).4 In particular, researchers who argue that political socialization is a 
process that takes place early in life tend go put more emphasis on the persistent 
impact of parents rather then the effects of schools (Beck and Jennings 1991; Achen 
2002). 
 In conclusion, the pre-adult socialization model predicts no significant changes 
of the gymnasium reform since individuals’ predispositions are already in place when 
they reach late adolescence (17-19 years old). In other words, if the hypothesis is to 
be proven valid, no significant decrease in the gap between students on theoretical 
and vocational programs after the reform are expected. 
 
3) Why we have reason to expect that the reform will partially decrease the 
gap – The sorting model 
At this stage, we also wish to include a third model that makes a more detailed 
account of what kind of educational effects can be expected. This is the so-called 
sorting model, which has recently been under debate in the literature on the civic 
effects of education (e.g. Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Nie and Hillygus 2001; 
Hillygus 2005; Tenn 2005; Helliwell and Putnam 2007; Campbell 2006; Desjardins 
2008). 
 The sorting model rests on the distinction between absolute and relative effects 
of education. These two distinctively different kinds of effects refer to two different 
causal relationships between education and democratic citizenship. According to 
Norman H Nie, Jane Junn and Norman Stehlik-Barry (NJSB), education is supposed 
 
3 A version of this model is sometimes referred to as the “impressionable years model of political lear-
ning”, according to which “core dispositions continue to crystallize well past adolescence, although at 
a slowed rate, perhaps reaching an asymptote at the end of early adulthood” (Sears and Funk 1999, 2). 
4 An extended argument is put forward by Robert Luskin (1990). He claims that education does not 
have any major influence on ‘political sophistication’. Education has, according to Luskin, only a 
spurious effect; it takes credit for other factors such as intelligence. In addition Alford, Funk and 
Hibbing (2005) have recently argued that genetics may have effects on political attitudes and behavior. 
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to affect individuals’ political enlightenment (i.e. political knowledge and democratic 
values) in an absolute way via the cognitive pathway. On the other hand, education is 
supposed to have impact on political engagement (i.e. political participation) in a 
relative way via the positional pathway.  
 When it comes to political participation, education is seen as a ‘positional 
good’: education matters to the extent that it determines a person’s social network 
position. It is assumed that it is not what is learned in school that promotes political 
participation, but rather an individuals social network position. Education works as a 
sorting mechanism, placing those with higher education closer to the centre of poli-
tical networks (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). NJSB writes: “When education 
works as a sorting mechanism by placing those with higher levels of education in 
positions closer to the center of social and political networks, more education among 
citizens only raises the baseline level of education for all positions.” (Nie, Junn, and 
Stehlik-Barry 1996, 131-132). When education has effects through the positional 
pathway, the level of an individual’s political participation depends on the relative 
social network position (which may be predicted successfully by education levels) 
rather than the skills promoted by education.  
 On the other hand, when education has effects through the cognitive pathway, 
individuals’ verbal and cognitive skills are promoted in an absolute way. These skills 
are subsequently supposed to increases individuals’ possibilities to gain knowledge 
about politics and appreciate the norms and legitimacy of democracy.5 
 In conclusion, the sorting model predicts that a raise in the educational levels 
will not lead to an increase in the levels of political participation. However, raised 
educational levels will make the citizenry more tolerant and knowledgeable. In this 
article, we will test the following hypothesis: since students on vocational programs 
maintain a lower position in the education hierarchy even after the reform compared 
to students on theoretical programs, we should not expect any significant increase in 
the levels of political participation among students on vocational programs. In other 
words, the gap considering political participation between students on theoretical and 
 
5 Considering political enlightenment, NJSB assume that education has absolute effects (in precisely 
the same way as predicted by the absolute education effects hypothesis introduced earlier). Absolute 
education effects should be understood as effects on an individual’s proficiency that is not dependent 
on other persons’ levels of education. The assumption that education has absolute effects on demo-
cratic enlightenment (i.e. political knowledge and democratic values) is due to the non-competitive in 
character of these skills. 
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vocational programs should not have been reduced after the reform. This is due to the 
fact that the effects of education on political participation are supposed to be relative: 
since the relative positions in the educational hierarchy remains constant we have no 
reason to believe that the gap should be leveled out.6 Yet, the gap concerning political 
knowledge, political attentiveness and trust7 should have been reduced due to the fact 
that education is supposed to not have relative effects on these dimensions.8 
Incorporating type of education into the sorting model may seem to be a rather simple 
modification of this model. However, it has as far as we know, not been done before.9  
 
The empirical analyses are tailored to evaluate the credibility of the three models. The 
absolute education effects models expects to find positive education effects on all four 
core indicators of democratic citizenship, while the pre-adult socialization model 
expects the effects of the educational reform to be small or nonexistent. The sorting 
model expects to find significant effects of education on political knowledge, 
attentiveness and trust but not on political participation.  
 However, it is important to keep in mind that our focus is on whether the gap 
between vocational and theoretical programs was reduced as a consequence of the 
reform. To sum up, the three models predict the following consequences of the gym-
nasium reform regarding the civic gap: a) the absolute education effects model 
predicts that the gap is reduced, b) the pre-adult socialization model predicts that the 
gap will prevail, and c) the sorting model predicts that the gap is partially reduced: the 
gap is expected to be reduced for political knowledge, attentiveness and trust, but not 
for political participation.  
 
6 In a study of Swedish youths conducted by the Swedish National Agency for Education it is shown 
that students on vocational programs still have lower status than students on theoretical programs after 
the reform. Both students from vocational and theoretical programs argue that vocational students have 
the lowest status whereas theoretical student have higher status (National Agency for Education 1995). 
7 It should be noted that trust is not investigated in NJBS’ analysis. However, Helliwell and Putnam 
(2007) have later shown that the effects of education on trust are cumulative rather than relative. 
8 In fact NJBS (1996, 61) argue that the effect of education on political attentiveness could be both 
absolute and relative. Yet, this gives us reason to expect the gap concerning political attentiveness 
should be reduced to a greater extent than the gap in political participation. 
9 To our knowledge, the only attempt made to include other factors than length of education into the 
sorting model is done by Hillygus (2005) who includes both quality of the institution attended and the 
curriculum studied in her “social network hypothesis”.  
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THE SWEDISH GYMNASIUM REFORM IN 1994 
The Swedish reform of the educational system in the 1990s provides us with a natural 
experiment long wished for in previous research. As David E. Campbell points out: 
“analysts should be aware of the research possibilities that arise from a change in a 
nation’s compulsory education laws” (Campbell 2006, 37). Furthermore, policy 
recommendations to undertake school reforms in order to improve citizenship charac-
teristics are very common when scholars discuss their results and make the final 
comments on their findings (e.g. Macedo 2003, 149-159; Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996, 278; Conover and Searing 2000; Nie and Hillygus 2001; Niemi and Junn 1998, 
149-159). This article is our response to their call for more systematic evaluations of 
authentic educational reforms that already have been implemented in a large scale. 
 The political intention behind the new architecture of the “unified gymnasium” 
was to create a “school for everyone” that functioned like a “social equalizer”. One of 
the explicit ambition was to level out the socio-economic gap between students on 
theoretical and vocational programs (Government Bill 1990/91:85; SOU 1997:107 
1997; Lundahl 2002, 691-692). Vocational programs were extended from two to three 
years and the amount of civic education provided to students on vocational programs 
increased from virtually zero to one hundred lesson hours. As a consequence of the 
reform, all students were after 1994 – at least in theory – exposed to the same amount 
of training in the core courses (including civics).10 
 The Swedish educational reform in 199411 harmonizes with a long egalitarian 
policy tradition aiming to maximize equality in opportunities in access to education 
(see Meghir and Palme 2005 for a study of the effects of prior educational reforms). 
Historically, education policies have been considered to be a central part of the 
Swedish Social Democrats attempts to promote social equality. For example, in his 
study of the ‘social democratic state’ Bo Rothstein claims that “school policy, just as 
labor market policy, was a component of a comprehensive political model for social 
change” (Rothstein 1996, 65). The unification of theoretical and vocational programs 
in 1994 was made in accordance with this tradition, since it was intended to reduce 
 
10 However, since students on, for example, the social science program take extra civics courses in 
addition to the core courses, they do still have a larger amount of civics courses than students on 
vocational programs.  
11 The decision was made in 1991, but the reform was implemented on a national scale in 1994. 
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well documented differences between students on educational programs depending on 
social background (Ekström 2003, 3; Lindensjö and Lundgren 2000, 4).  
 The reform generated a massive reconstruction of the gymnasium in order to 
achieve social equality (SOU 1997:107 1997). In an international comparison, similar 
unifications of theoretical and vocational educational programs at a national scale are 
very rare (Lindberg 2003). In this context, four main changes of the Swedish 
gymnasium are important: 
 1) Extension of the length of vocational education programs. In the previous 
system the length of the programs varied from two (vocational) to two, three or four 
years (theoretical). In the new gymnasium, all educational programs were 
standardized to three years of length (SOU 1997:107 1997).  
 2) Introduction of core subjects. Additionally, a system with ‘core subjects’ was 
introduced. All ‘core subjects’ – such as mathematics, English, and civics – are 
studied on all educational programs. They should also be equivalent when it comes to 
the courses ‘goals to aim for’, and the overall curriculum content and structure; 
regardless of on what program they are given. In other words, students on the social 
science and natural science programs takes the same core courses as students on, for 
example, the motor and transport engineering program or food manufacturing 
program.12  
 3) Equal access to higher education. In the pre 1994 gymnasium, students on 
vocational programs did not meet the requirements for admittance to universities. 
Making the universities open and accessible to all young citizens was a main 
objective with the reform of the educational system (see e.g. Björklund, Edin, and 
Krueger 2004; Westling Allodi 2007). Consequently, after 1994, pupils who success-
fully graduate from all national upper secondary school programs, including the 
 
12 Lgy70 was the valid curriculum before 1994. When Lgy70 were in practice, students in the practical 
vocational programs had to choose at least one of the following subjects to spend maximum three 
hours every week on: English, religion, psychology, social science, consumer knowledge, 
mathematics, art or music. Consequently, depending on the choice of subjects, some students did not 
attend any social sciences (civics) courses at all in the upper secondary school. After the reform, the 
core subjects cover a substantial part of the 2 500 upper secondary credits that every program 
comprise: “All of the national programs include the eight core subjects of: English, the Arts, Physical 
Education and Health, Mathematics, General Science, Social Studies [civics], Swedish (or Swedish as 
a Second Language) and Religion. Together, the core subjects add up to 750 credits” (National Agency 
for Education 2000). Consequently, every student on a national program takes 100 credits in civics. 1 
credit is equal to 1 lesson hour. In 2004, 74 per cent of the students on upper secondary schools studied 
on national programs. 
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vocational programs, matched the matriculation requirements for university studies 
(National Agency for Education 2000).13  
 4) Democratic fostering. The fostering of young citizens democratic virtues was 
much more heavily emphasized in the new curriculum (lgy94) than what was the case 
under the old regime. For example, two of the central goals for schools to ‘strife 
towards’ is to “develop [students] will to actively contribute to a deeper democracy in 
working and civic life” and “on the basis of knowledge and democratic principles 
further develop their ability to work in democratic ways” (The National Agency for 
Education 2006, 15). 
DATA 
We aim to estimate the effects of the reform on the gap between students from 
theoretical and vocational programs on four core dimensions of democratic 
citizenship: political participation, knowledge, attentiveness and trust. Unfortunately, 
this broad array of dependent variables is not to be found in a single survey. Because 
of this, our evaluation of the Swedish educational reform rests on statistical analyses 
of data from three sources: 1) the Swedish National Election Studies (SNES 1994, 
1998, 2002, and 2006), the Swedish Citizen Study (SCS 1987, 1997, and 2002), and 
the studies from the Society-Opinion-Media institute (SOM 1998-2006, YouthSOM 
2000). All studies are based on national representative samples (except YouthSOM). 
The SNES-studies and SCS-studies are based on face-to-face interviews (response 
rates vary between 69 and 80 percent) carried out by the Statistics Sweden (SCB), 
while the SOM-studies are based on mail questionnaires carried out by the SOM-
institute at Gothenburg university (response rates vary between 60 and 68 percent).14  
 We would like to emphasize that the use of these datasets for measuring effects 
of education has considerable advantages compared to the data used in most studies 
of educational effects. In general the data that is used in these kinds of studies is 
questionnaires distributed in classrooms. There are several disadvantages with this 
 
13 After the 1991 reform, so-called national programs were introduced; all of these programs are three 
years. After a modification of the curriculum in 2000, there are 17 national programs. As pointed out 
by the national educational board: “The programs provide a broad general education and eligibility to 
study at the university or post-secondary level” (National Agency for Education 2000). 
14 With the exception of the SCS 2002, SOM 2006, and SNES 2006, all data are deposited at the 
Swedish Social Science Data Service (http://www.ssd.gu.se). SCS: SSD0474, SSD0796. SNES: 
SSD0812, SSD0750, SSD0570, SSD0812. SOM: SSD0851, SSD0827, SSD0813, SSD0801, 
SSD0797, SSD0761, SSD0746, SSD0739, SSD0821.  
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kind of data. For example, since students are too young to vote, there is only possible 
to measure the intention to vote. The problem is that we do not know whether 
intention to vote is a good predictor for actual voting later in life. Furthermore, the 
environment in which the questionnaires are distributed may have a negative bias on 
the results. It is an important advantage that we do not rely on measure of intentions 
to participate in political activities, but rather actual performances of political 
activities. Furthermore, using these datasets gives us the opportunity to investigate 
whether there are long-term effects of education. That would of course be impossible 
if we rely on data that draw on classroom distributed questionnaires. 
 We pooled together the respective datasets from each series (SNES, SCS, and 
SOM) and constructed subsets consisting of respondents 29 years or younger at the 
time of interview. The cutting point 29 years was chosen to strike a balance between 
two conflicting criteria: at the one hand we wanted to analyze data collected as close 
to graduation from the gymnasium as possible. On the other hand, we had to be 
certain to have enough respondents in our statistical analyses.15  
 The design of the study is equivalent to 2x2 factorial experimental designs. The 
two factors are 1) regime (levels are pre and post the educational reform of 1994) and 
2) educational program (levels are theoretical and vocational). However, it is not the 
main effects of regime or educational program that is our main concern here. The 
empirical analyses focus on the interaction effect of regime (PP) and educational 
program (TV). It is the size and direction of the effect (PP×TV) that determine the 
credibility of the three hypotheses.  
 The empirical analyses will advance as follows. First, descriptive statistics for 
all core indicators of democratic citizenship are reported. Here we also present t-tests 
for differences of means between educational programs for both educational systems 
(pre and post reform). Secondly, we perform analyses of variance in order to test 
whether the interaction effects (PP×TV) are statistically significant. Results from the 
 
15 The inclusion of respondents that have graduated up to ten years ago may be considered to have 
potentially negative implications for our analysis. Obviously, processes that take place during the pe-
riod after graduation may substantially blur the direct effects of education. Moreover, it is well known 
that other transitions in a young person’s life (getting a job, finding a partner, building a family) may 
also have large effects on core indicators of democratic citizenship. However, let us underscore what 
we are interested in whether the reform had any long-term equalizing effects on democratic citizenship. 
Consequently, in this article we are not interested in the effects of education in relation to other factors 
that may also have influence on levels of democratic citizenship. What we are interested in is whether 
the new reformed gymnasium leveled out the systematically unequal levels in indicators of democratic 
citizenship.  
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ANOVA are illustrated with a number of graphs. Thirdly, we perform additional tests 
for potential alternative explanations to why gap between students on vocational and 
theoretical programs may or may not have changed after the 1994 reform. 
 Given the centrality of the effects of education in contemporary political 
participation research, one would expect that large national surveys included 
extensive and standardized measurements of all dimensions of education (length, 
type, content, and educational trajectories of individuals). Unfortunately, we have 
become aware that most surveys actually do not. Consequently, the precision in the 
educational program variable varies between data sources.16 
 In the SNES-datasets there is only information about each respondent’s highest 
achieved education. This means that if a person has achieved a university degree later 
in life, we cannot tell which gymnasium program this individual attended. Before 
1994 this constitutes no considerable problem, since only those who went to 
theoretical programs met the entrance requirements to universities. We can quite 
certainly predict that an individual who has attended education at the university level 
has a theoretical gymnasium education.  
 In the years after the reform this is more complicated since students from 
vocational programs also met the entrance requirements to universities. Even so, we 
know from external sources that university students mainly have a study background 
from a theoretical gymnasium program.17 Individuals with post-gymnasium education 
are therefore coded as belonging to those who attended a theoretical program. Of 
course, it would be preferable if we had information about every respondent’s 
gymnasium education.  However, the alternative way to handle the situation – to 
exclude those who went to higher education after their gymnasium education – seems 
 
16 Preceding the reform, a pilot scheme that offered three-year vocational programs was carried out in a 
number of municipalities. It would have been preferable if we could compare students who went to the 
pilot scheme programs to those who went to the ‘old’ gymnasium at the same time. For a number of 
reasons we have not been able to do that. First, we do not know in which municipality the respondents 
went to gymnasium. Therefore, we cannot distinguish pilot scheme municipalities from non-pilot 
scheme municipalities. Secondly, in the pilot scheme municipalities, students where offered both two 
and three year study programs. Therefore, even if we knew at which municipality each respondent 
attended gymnasium studies, we cannot say if he or she went to a pilot scheme program or not. 
Unfortunately, the pilot scheme brings some marginal distortion to our education program variables 
before the reform. The number of students who attended pilot scheme programs where 5.8 per cent 
during the first year, 9.4 per cent during the second and 10.5 per cent during the third year. See 
Ekström (2003) for a detailed account of the pilot scheme.     
17 For example, in 2006, 74 percent of those who attended universities before they were 21 years old 
had completed a theoretical study program (Swedish National Agency for higher Education / Statistics 
Sweden 2007, 80). 
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more problematic and unattractive. Excluding these respondents would give a 
distorted impression of students on theoretical programs since those who do not 
attend university education after graduation from a theoretical gymnasium study 
program are a minority of these students.  
 Since the SNES studies are two wave panels between elections, we can make 
corrections to the education variable by using information about respondents’ 
gymnasium education taken from a previous panel wave. To compensate the lack of 
precision in the gymnasium education variables we will analyze the differences 
between students who went to universities and students who ‘only’ went to theoretical 
gymnasium educations. In the SNES 2002 and 2006 we have access to register data 
of all respondents’ exact level and type of education. In the earlier surveys we rely on 
answers of an interview question about respondents’ education.  
 In the SCS-survey, we use the same procedure, coding university graduates as 
belonging to those who attended theoretical gymnasium study programs. In SOM, we 
have a question about the level of education but also a question about the type of 
education that gives us the possibility to distinguish between vocational and theo-
retical programs. Lastly, in YouthSOM there is fortunately a very precise question 
about what specific study program individuals has attended during the gymnasium. 
The education variable in this dataset is therefore very accurate. 
 Let us now introduce the indicators of democratic citizenship we will use to test 
the credibility of the three models. 18 In this article, we investigate four core 
dimensions of democratic citizenship – i.e. political participation, political know-
ledge, political attentiveness and trust.19 We do not claim that the four dimensions of 
democratic citizenship represent a conclusive characteristic of the ideal democratic 
citizen. What kind of citizenship ideal that is considered as most desirable is of course 
depending on which democratic theory one vindicates. However, the four dimensions 
constitute what we believe are the central elements of democratic citizenship that 
most often appear in analyses in contemporary literature. All dependent variables in 
the analyses have been coded so that they vary between 0-1 where 1 indicates a 
 
18 Unfortunately, we have not been able to include the dimension democratic values such as tolerance 
in our analysis. The available datasets lack measures of tolerance that is comparable before and after 
the reform.  
19 Trust is not usually included as an indicator of democratic citizenship in studies of educational 
effects. However, since trust is a central element of social capital, which is considered to be 
fundamental for a democratic society to be well functioning (Putnam 1992) we have included it in our 
analysis. 
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positive answer (i.e. highest level of participation, knowledge, etc). First, we 
investigate four different indicators of political participation: voter turnout, party 
activities, contacting and manifestations. Second, the political knowledge variables 
consist of two index variables. The first index is made up of a set of questions 
concerning knowledge about which party a set of political leaders represent. These 
politicians are not party leaders; however they have actively taken part in the political 
debate and have frequently been exposed to media coverage of Swedish politics. 
Thus, a political knowledgeable person would be aware of which party they represent. 
The second political knowledge index consists of eight questions concerning political 
events and the political system with true or false answers.  
 Third, political attentiveness is measured by an additive index that is produced 
by three variables concerning political interest, to what extent an individual read 
about politics in newspapers and the level of participation in political discussions. In 
addition, we also use a standard survey question about political interests. 
 Fourth, the two trust measure political trust and interpersonal trust. The first 
one concern to what extent respondents trust Swedish politicians. The second ques-
tion is about to what extent the respondent believes that one can trust other people in 
general. Further details about coding and question wording are found in Appendix A.  
 
RESULTS 
We begin our analyses with presenting descriptive statistics for all core indicators of 
democratic citizenship in the table 1. In addition, we present results from 10 of the 
indicators as graphs to illustrate the change of the gap after the reform. In table 1, we 
present the mean scores for citizens who went to theoretical and vocational study 
programs before respectively after the reform. We also present differences of means 
between educational programs for both educational systems. To compare whether the 
differences between students on theoretical and vocational programs are statistically 
significant we conducted two-sample t-tests, adjusted for unequal variances when 
necessary. In all, we report 28 t-test on 14 indicators to compare students from 
theoretical and vocational study programs on the core dimensions of democratic 
citizenship.  
 Regarding political participation, the results show that citizens who have 
completed theoretical educational programs score higher than those who attended 
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vocational programs in every comparison. When comparing students on theoretical 
and vocational study programs after the reform, students from theoretical programs 
still attain higher levels in every comparison concerning political participation. 
Regarding party activities and manifestations, the gap is actually increasing. 
  On the other hand, the gap has declined regarding contacts. But the decline of 
the gap is mostly due to the fact that students on theoretical programs who went to the 
new gymnasium score lower than students who went to comparable study programs 
earlier. So, it is not the kind of decreased gap that is expected, ceteris paribus, by the 
absolute education model. Apparently, this model expects that the gap is closed due 
to the fact that the levels in political participation among students on vocational 
programs are leveled up.  
 Next, we look closer at the knowledge gap. If the sorting model and the 
absolute education model should gain support, the raised educational levels would 
lead to a citizenry that is more knowledgeable. However, the knowledge gap is intact 
after the reform. The overall trend is that the levels of political knowledge are 
declining; yet the gap remains. In relation to prior research it is somewhat surprising 
that the gap concerning political knowledge has not been reduced as a consequence of 
the increased amount of civic education that the students on vocational programs have 
been exposed to.  
 Return next to political attentiveness. Once more, the same pattern is visible. 
The levels of political attentiveness are declining, yet the gap remains. A statistically 
significant gap is evident in all comparisons between students on theoretical and 
vocational study programs both before and after the reform.  
 Regarding trust we also notice a statistically significant gap both before and 
after the reform. The gap slightly decreasing in one of the comparisons is. In two of 
them it is slightly increasing and in the fourth comparison the gap is constant. So, 
even if the size of the gap varies in our measures it clearly exist a gap in levels of 
trust before the reform and it remains afterwards. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Average scores on indicators of political participation among citizens 18-29 years who have completed vocational or 
theoretical study programs pre- or post the 1994 educational reform (Means, SD, and differences of means). F-values for the 
interaction effect of regime (Pre Post), educational program (Theoretical Vocational) and (PP×TV). 
            
 Pre 
Reform – 
Vocational
Pre 
Reform – 
Theoretical 
 Post 
Reform – 
Vocational
Post 
Reform – 
Theoreitcal
      
 Mean  Mean  Differences 
of means 
Mean Mean Difference 
of means 
 FPP FTV FPP×TV n 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION            
Voting1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.79  .91  +.12*** .77 .89 +.12***  1.53 53.99*** 0.01 1842 
            
Party activities index2  .02 .04  +.03** .00 .05 +.05***  0.15 5.30** 0.33 484 
            
Contacting2 .10 .14  +.03 .07 .10 +.02  2.03 1.43 0.03 484 
            
Contacting1 .06 .15  +.09*** .08 .11 +.03  0.52 13.64*** 3.19* 885 
            
Manifestations2 .18 .21  +.03 .12 .20 +.08**  2.38 6.23** 1.47 478 
            
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE            
Factual knowledge of current state-
of-affairs and the political system1
.60 .68  +.08*** .46 .57 +.10***  50.49*** 89.54*** 2.38 1333 
            
Factual knowledge of political 
representatives1
.22 .40  +.18*** .13 .26 +.13***  97.48*** 53.86*** 0.70 
 
1190 
            
POLITICAL ATTENTIVENESS            
Political attentiveness index1 .41 .52  +.11*** .37 .48 +.12***  8.10*** 71.48*** 0.07 1190 
            
Political interest3 .42 .53  +.11*** .35 .51 +.16***  18.61*** 183.19*** 6.02** 3310 
            
Political Interest4 .40 .53  +.13*** .37 .49 +.12***  6.76*** 62.45*** 0.20 1105 
            
TRUST            
            
Interpersonal trust3 .60 .65  +.06*** .55 .63 +.08***  18.86*** 58.62*** 1.84 1578 
            
Interpersonal trust4 .56 .66  +.10*** 58  64  +.06***  0.05 31.33*** 1.69 1085 
            
Political trust3 .37 .40  +.03* .37  .44  +.07***  2.68 13.37*** 2.74* 3307 
            
Political trust4 .22 .26  +.04** .24  .28  +.04*  1.41 4.82** 0.00 830 
            
Comment: 1 Source: The Swedish National Election Surveys 1994, 1998, 2002 & 2006. 2 Source: The Swedish Citizen Surveys 
1997 & 2002. 3 Source SOM-Surveys 98-06. 4 YouthSOM 2000. ***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.1. 
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To conclude, no equalizing effects of the reform are visible in our results. In every 
comparison there is gap between students from theoretical and vocational study 
programs. Most importantly, students from vocational programs always score lower. The 
gap is statistically significant In 20 of 24 comparisons. Only on one indicator – 
contacting – does the gap cease to be significant after the reform, but in this case it is 
mostly due to the fact the scores among students on theoretical programs are declining.  
 Furthermore, we deconstructed all the indexes (except the knowledge indexes) and 
conducted t-test on each and every single variable that the indexes are made up of. In 
total we conducted 54 comparisons. Students from theoretical programs scored higher 
than students from vocational programs in 51 tests. The differences were statistically 
significant in 37 of 54 tests. Regarding six single variables (all of them concerning 
contacting or manifestations) significant differences before the reform ceased to be 
significant after the reform. But it is very important to note that in none of these cases are 
the decreased gaps due to vocational students reaches the same levels as theoretical 
students. In fact the results show the a contrary trend, in all the six cases where 
significant gaps before the reform end up being significant afterwards it is mostly due to 
the fact the that the scores among theoretical students are leveled down. The leveling 
down tendency among students on theoretical programs is stronger than the leveling up 
trend among vocational students in five of the six cases where the gap is decreasing. In 
the sixth case, the differences have diminished due to both groups having lower levels 
after the reform.  
 Our next step was to conduct ANOVA-tests in order to examine whether inter-
action effects of study program and educational system are statistically significant. The 
results from the ANOVA are reported in the three columns to the right in table 1. Here 
we show the F-tests for the two factors (TV + PP) and the interaction effect. In all, 14 
ANOVA-test were conducted. At this point it is the interaction effect that is of interest. If 
the absolute education model makes correct predictions, we should see significant 
interaction effects between regime and program on every indicator and this should, 
ceteris paribus, be a result of a levelling up trend among citizens who went to vocational 
study programs. On the other hand, if the sorting model is correct these effects should be 
absent on political participation, yet the citizenry should be more politically 
knowledgeable, political attentive and trustful.  
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 We begin to look closer at the indicators of political participation. We only find one 
significant interaction effect on these indicators and that is contacting. But as pointed out 
earlier, this is mostly due to a leveling down tendency among students from theoretical 
programs.  
 Regarding political knowledge and attentiveness there is no significant interaction 
effect. We have also conducted ANOVA on the single variables of political interest. The 
interaction effect is significant in one of these tests, but this is due to an increase of the 
gap. As regards trust, there are neither any significant interaction effects that are due to a 
decrease of the gap. The interaction effect is insignificant in three of the four tests on the 
trust indicators. In the fourth test the interaction effect is significant due to an increased 
gap. 
 To sum up, the gap between students on vocational and theoretical programs 
remains. It is remarkable that we find no significant interaction effect that is a 
consequence of vocational students catching up with the citizens who went to theoretical 
gymnasium study programs. Consequently, the hypotheses about positive effects of 
education gets weak support since the gap between students on different study programs 
are not leveled out after the reform, not even partially as predicted by the sorting model. 
Quite the contrary, the results are in accordance with the predictions made by the pre-
adults socialization model. 
 However, note carefully that we do not claim that education does not have any civic 
effects whatsoever. What we do claim to have shown is that extended educational levels 
at this stage, i.e. late adolescence, do not seem to work as a quick fix to equalize 
asymmetrical levels in political participation, knowledge, attentiveness and trust among 
citizens with different types of education. Our point is only that the school reform did not 
reduce the gap between students on theoretical and vocational programs. 
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Figure 1d 
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Figure 1e 
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Figure 3 
.41
.52
.37
.48
Theoretical
Vocational
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
Pre reform Post reform
 
Political Attentiveness
 
Source: SNES 1994, 1998, 2002 & 2006 
(n=1190). 
 
 
 20
 21
Figure 4a 
.22
.26
.24
.28
Theoretical
Vocational
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
Pre reform Post reform
Political trust
 
Figure 4b 
.60
.65
.55
.63
Theoretical
Vocational
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
Pre reform Post reform
Interpersonal trust
 Source: YouthSOM (n=830) Source: SOM 1998-2006 (n=1578) 
 
 
ADDITIONAL TESTS 
Even though our results show no indications that the reform of the Swedish 
educational system had any equalizing impact on the unequal levels of democratic 
citizenship indicators, it could still be possible that the models that predict positive 
effects of education on democratic citizenship are correct. Maybe the positive effects 
have been cancelled out by other factors? In order to investigate whether cancelling 
out effects are hiding the positive effects of the reform, we will to respond to a 
number of objections that may arise. We will discuss four potential objections which 
may explain the absent positive effects of the reform: a) demographic changes, b) 
slow implementation, c) contextual changes and d) imperfect education program 
variables. 
 
1) The gap was not reduced because of demographic changes? 
One might raise the objection that our results do not show a closed gap between 
students on theoretical and vocational study programs because of demographic 
changes. We will investigate how forceful this objection is by examine whether there 
was any change in the proportion of students with different social characteristics on 
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theoretical and vocational programs after the reform. Did the study programs tend to 
attract different groups of students after the reform compared to before?  
 First, let us consider the gender distribution on the study programs before and 
after the reform. The proportion of males is increasing from 53 to 61 percent on 
vocational programs after the reform.20 The same tendency is valid in all our datasets. 
Can this explain way the differences between students from theoretical and vocational 
programs are not leveled out? It is unlikely that this could explain the absence of a 
decreasing gap concerning political knowledge since males generally score higher 
than females in our tests. Consequently, if more males were recruited to the 
vocational study programs we would expect the levels of political knowledge among 
those students to rise, not to decline. Even so, could it be possible that the changed 
proportion of males on vocational programs cancel out positive effects of education 
on political participation? Here we do not find a general trend that males score higher. 
But even if we isolate females, there is an increased gap between females on 
theoretical and vocational programs after the reform. Consequently, the changed 
gender distribution did not seem to cancel out the positive effects of the reform. 
 Secondly, did the reformed gymnasium change the choice of study programs 
among students from different social classes? Perhaps the reform did not level out the 
gap because a greater amount of students from the working class may have been 
recruited to vocational programs. Since it is well known that the levels of political 
knowledge and participation is lower in this group, one might believe that this 
tendency cancel out the positive effects.  
 This objection fails. Table 2 clearly shows that the social class distribution of 
students remained generally the same after the reform. The vocational programs 
remained dominated by working class students. Theoretical programs, on the other 
hand, have a broader base and are dominated by students from the middle class. This 
disproportional distribution of students from different social classes did not change 
after the reform. 
 
20 Source: SNES 1994, 1998, 2002 & 2006. 
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Table 2. Subjective class perceptions among students on theoretical and vocational 
gymnasium study programs before and after the 1994 reform (percent).  
      
 Working class Lower Middle 
class  
Higher Middle class  Farmer  Company owner 
 
      
      
Vocational programs      
Pre reform 78 11 0 4 6 
Post reform 75 15 3 1 6 
      
Theoretical programs      
Pre reform 39 28 23 2 8 
Post reform 40 28 28 0 5 
      
Comment: Source: The Swedish National Election Surveys 1994, 1998, 2002 & 2006.  
 
 
2) The gap was not reduced because of slow implementation? 
Major reforms of the educational systems may be difficult to implement and it will of 
course take a while to put a new educational system into practice. For example, 
Rothstein (1996, ch 7) has shown that prior school reforms in Sweden have been hard 
to implement. Among other problems, old practices may be inherited into the new 
system. Therefore one could argue that it is not reasonable to expect that the new 
system was completely implemented already in 1994; perhaps it had the predicted 
effects on democratic citizenship first after a few years time? Consequently, a 
possible objection to why our results do not show any reduced gap could be that we 
have not let enough time to pass after the reform. Maybe we simply expect too much 
to happen too soon. 
 We believe that our results hold for this objection. In order to undermine this 
counterargument we have rerun our tests and exclusively compared the results from 
the SNES 1994 and 2006. SNES 2006 is the most recent available dataset. At the time 
the survey was conducted, 12 years had passed after the reform. Even if the 
implementation of the reform was slow, it should by then have passed enough time 
for the reform to take effect.  
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Table 3. Average scores on indicators of political participation, political knowledge and 
political attentiveness among citizens 18-29 years who have completed vocational or 
theoretical study programs pre- or post the 1994 educational reform, SNES 1994 & 
2006 (Means, SD, and differences of means).  
        
 1994 
(Pre 
Reform) 
   2006  
(Post 
reform) 
  
 Mean (SD) n  Mean (SD) n 
        
Political participation        
Voting         
Vocational programs .85 (.36) 209  .77 (.42) 151 
Theoretical programs .94 (.24) 347  .94 (.24) 221 
Differences of means +.09    +.17   
P-value .001***    .000***   
        
Contacting        
Vocational programs .07 (.17) 181  .08 (.18) 38 
Theoretical programs .16 (.23) 290  .13 (.24) 70 
Differences of means +.09    +.05   
P-value 000***    .131   
        
Political attentiveness         
Vocational programs .45 (.17) 167  .43 (.21) 40 
Theoretical programs .55 (.18) 307  .54 (.19) 72 
Differences of means +.10    +.11   
P-value .000***    .003***   
        
Political knowledge        
Factual knowledge of current 
state-of-affairs and the political 
system 
       
Vocational programs .56 (.19) 186  .40 (.19) 79 
Theoretical programs .60 (.17) 322  .52 (.19) 142 
Differences of means +.04   +.11   
P-value .005***   .000***   
       
Factual knowledge of political 
representatives 
       
Vocational programs .29 (.25) 123  .13 (.15) 79 
Theoretical programs .42 (.27) 261  .25 (.22) 142 
Differences of means +.13    +.12   
P-value .000***    .000***   
        
        
Comment:1 Source: The Swedish National Election Surveys 1994, 1998, 2002 & 2006. 
*=p<.10 **=p<.05 ***=p<.01. 
 
Table 3 shows a detailed comparison between the results from the 1994 and the 2006 
SNES surveys. We can clearly see that the gap is not leveled out 12 years after the 
reform. The gap is even increasing regarding voting, political attentiveness, and 
‘factual political knowledge of current state-of-affairs and the political system’. Once 
again, concerning contacting, the gap is reduced due to a leveling down tendency 
among theoretical students. 
 Additionally, we have conducted ANOVA to investigate whether the 
interaction effect between study program and educational system are significant when 
comparing exclusively the 1994 and the 2006 survey. The interaction effect is 
significant in two of the tests: voting and ‘political knowledge of current state of 
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affairs and the political system’. In both these cases this is due to an increased gap 
between citizens with different types of education. In conclusion, the objection that 
we do not notice a decreased gap because of slow implementation does not gain 
support in our analysis of the results from the 1994 and 2006. Even if we measure the 
levels of democratic citizenship characteristics 12 years after the reform – we still do 
not find any reduced gap.  
 
3) The gap did not close because of contextual changes? 
A third objection that could be raised is that the gap did not close because of 
contextual changes. The argument goes like this: it is not reasonable to expect a 
reduced gap as a consequence of the reform since the contextual factors during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s are utterly different from the contextual factors in the 
1980s and early 1990s. First and foremost, the 1990s in Sweden were characterized 
by a severe low recession in the business cycle, while the 1980s was the heydays of 
an economic upswing. The economic crises in the 1990s may have put more pressure 
on students from vocational programs than students from theoretical programs. 
Citizens who attended vocational programs run a greater risk to get unemployed and 
their private economy was more vulnerable to the disadvantages that the recession 
resulted in. These factors may have caused them to lose faith in politics.  
 If the contextual factors had remained constant after the reform we may have 
seen a reduced gap, the argument goes. Unfortunately, we cannot control for this kind 
of contextual changes in our analysis. For that reason we cannot refute this argument. 
However, we do not consider this to be a decisive argument for two reasons. First, it 
is not necessarily obvious why these contextual factors should have a greater impact 
on students from vocational programs than students from theoretical programs. 
Secondly, it is not obvious why contextual factors of this kind should completely 
cancel out the positive effects of education on all examined dimensions of democratic 
citizenship. For example, why should an economic recession lead to the absence of 
positive effects of education on political knowledge and political attentiveness? 
Couldn’t it be the other way around – young citizens get more politically attentive 
and gain more knowledge about politics during the recession since political issues at 
that time attract a lot of attention?  
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4) Our results do not show a closed gap due to insufficient education program 
variables 
A fourth objection to our results is that our analysis rests on imperfect education 
program variables. The argument goes like this: since we (in some analysis) had no 
alternative but to code university graduates as belonging to the group of students who 
went to theoretical programs we do in fact measure the effect of university education 
rather than theoretical gymnasium study programs. We will show that this objection 
fails. Of course it is a weakness that we do not have perfect education variables in all 
datasets. However, we will put forward two arguments in order to show that our 
results do not rest in flawed measures.  
 First of all, in YouthSOM we have got close to perfect information about which 
study program an individual has attended. Still there is a statistically significant gap 
between students with different types of education in these analyses. If the counter-
argument should be proven right no such persistent gap should be evident in our 
results. 
 Secondly in order to eliminate the possible effect of university education and 
isolate the effect of gymnasium education, we have rerun our analyses and excluded 
all respondents with a university degree. We have performed all our analysis ones 
again to compare students with different types of education, this time exclusively 
those who ‘only’ have a gymnasium education. The results show that even if those 
who have attended universities are excluded in the analyses there is still a gap 
between students with different types of education. Regarding political participation 
there still exists statistically significant differences (at the p<.01 level) on voting, 
manifestations and party activities. Concerning political knowledge and political 
attentiveness, there remains a statistically significant gap on all indicators (at the 
p<.01 level) between students with different types of education after the reform. As 
regards trust, we already have very precise education variables that confirm the 
persistence of the gap after the reform. In conclusion, even if we compare students 
from vocational programs with the students who have ‘only’ went to theoretical 
gymnasium programs and have no further education – the gap is still confirmed.  
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CONCLUSION 
We have provided the first systematic analyses of the civic effects of the radical 
unification of the Swedish educational system in the 1990s. The results from our 
investigation clashes with the results (as well as many hopes and expectations) in 
previous research on educational effects. Years of education is generally considered 
to be a solid predictor for democratic citizenship dimensions such as political 
participation and political knowledge. However, we find that an additional year of 
education does not reduce systematic differences in levels of democratic citizenship 
characteristics related to type of education. 
 Furthermore, the conventional wisdom is that providing social science courses 
that explicitly aim at promoting students civic virtues will promote the various 
dimensions of democratic citizenship. In this case, however, the egalitarian reform of 
the Swedish gymnasium that pawed way for more civic education did not produce 
hypothesized positive effects on any of the core dimensions under study. Systematic 
unequal levels in political participation, political knowledge, political attentiveness 
and trust between students on vocational and theoretical programs prevailed after the 
reform. Note that we do not argue that schools or the educational system causes 
differences between students with different types of education. What we do claim is 
that the reformed educational system has not been better able to reduce these 
differences than the previous gymnasium before the major changes in the 1990s. 
 However, on a number of indicators, the gaps between citizens from vocational 
and theoretical programs are actually decreasing. This could at first glance seem to 
support the absolute education effects model. But let us underscore that the absolute 
education model does not predict a reduced gap of this kind and it is not in 
accordance with the intention of the reform. This is due to the fact that the decreased 
gap is mainly a consequence of lower scores among students from theoretical 
programs after the reform. Since the intention with the reform was to promote equal 
outcomes, these results may be misinterpreted as being in accordance with the 
intentions of the reform. However, since these results were not predicted by any of 
the models presented, it could be useful to draw a parallel to the discussion on 
equality in moral philosophy to interpret these results. Derek Parfit (1997, 2000) has 
argued that equality could be achieved by leveling down the level of well being for 
those who are best off to the same level as those worse off. Now, equality would be 
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achieved – but since this change does not seem to be good for someone it seems 
counterintuitive to judge this outcome as better than the initial unequal state where 
people were overall better off. This argument, referred to as the Leveling Down 
Objection is widely considered to be of great force. 
 As a matter of fact, the intention with the reform was of course not to achieve 
equal civic outcomes by any means; rather the intentions were to raise vocational 
students to the same level as theoretical students. Likewise, the sort of equalized state 
predicted by the absolute education model should be, ceteris paribus, caused by raised 
levels among students from vocational programs. Unfortunately for the proponents of 
the absolute education effects model, we do not find a decreased gap of this kind. 
Even if we find some results that show a slightly decreased gap, these results are rare 
exceptions. The overall trend is that the gap between students who went to theoretical 
respectively vocational study programs prevails. 
  The persistent inequalities in levels of political participation may be considered 
to be troublesome for several reasons. A number of political scientists argue that 
equal levels of political participation should be considered to be a democratic ideal. 
For example, Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) argue that equal voice is necessary 
to give equal consideration to every ones interests. As Lijphart (1997, 1) writes: 
“unequal participation spells unequal influence”. Furthermore our results support the 
well-known fact that “inequality of representation and influence are not randomly 
distributed but systematically biased in favor of more privileged citizens“ (ibid). 
 What implications do our results have for the three explanatory models? The 
revised version of the sorting model does only gain partial support. According to 
NJSB, a more educated citizenry would be more knowledgeable and democratic 
enlightened. But the reform of the Swedish gymnasium has not had these effects. Our 
results rather support the pre-adult socialization model, since there are no significant 
effects of an extra year of education as well as an increased amount of civics courses.  
 Most importantly, our results weaken our confidence in the absolute education 
effects model. Our results show clearly that increased levels of education and 
changed curriculum content do not necessarily work as a quick fix to equalize levels 
of civic outcomes. But one should be careful to note that the absolute education 
model and the pre-adult socialization model represent two extreme expectations on 
the effects of education. We do not claim to have shown that education completely 
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lacks civic effects since we have not examined the effects of education in relation to 
other socializing factors. Nevertheless, it is not realistic to expect a linear effect of 
education on democratic citizenship. It is likely that education of some specific sort 
during some specific years may have severe effects. It is a central task for research on 
educational effects on democratic citizenship to investigate what kind of educations 
that has most effect at which point in life. Our contribution to the field is to show that 
a raise in the educational levels in late adolescence seem to be of minor importance; 
this period does not seem to be the ‘impressionable years’. However, this is 
somewhat unexpected in relation to previous research. For example Niemi and Junn 
conclude that civic education during post secondary school has the most impact 
(Niemi and Junn 1998, 156).  
 In relation to the fact that the gap is actually increasing on some indicators, we 
may perhaps instead consider whether extended length of education may have 
negative effects on democratic citizenship characteristics.21 Some young people does 
in fact not like being in school. Perhaps an extended education that demands greater 
efforts of the students places a burden on these young people. In effect, an 
educational system that demands greater efforts of students may marginalize those 
young people who do not manage to get all the way through the gymnasium success-
fully. In effect this may weaken their willingness to participate in civic activities, get 
knowledge about politics, etc. 
 Moreover, we wish to make clear once again that the design of this study do not 
permit us to discriminate the effects of educational length from the effects of 
educational content, since the reform brought about a simultaneous change in the 
number of years and the amount of civic education on the vocational programs. 
However, while educational length was increased and the curriculum content was 
modified, the overall type of education remained the same. Therefore, our results 
indicate that type of education is a potentially forceful factor that needs to be taken 
into account.  
 This is an important contribution to the discussion about the effects of 
education: the overall type of study program may matter more than has previously 
been acknowledged. However, the crucial question of how type of study program may 
matter remains unsolved. There are a number of potential explanations. First, certain 
 
21 See Murphy (2007) for an argument against civic education in public schools. 
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subcultures may develop on specific study programs. The remaining gap between 
students on different educational programs may be a consequence of shared norms 
and patterns of behavior that evolve among students on the study programs. Secondly, 
it may be an effect of value transmission; since some curriculums put a greater 
emphasis on specific norms it is possible that it has effects on the students’ political 
behavior. Thirdly, the quality of education in the core courses on vocational programs 
may be lower than on theoretical programs. It would be interesting to know more 
specifically what the teachers teach, how they teach it, etc. Moreover, since the 
classroom climate has been considered to be of major importance in a number of 
studies on educational effects it would be of interest to know whether the classroom 
climates may differ on vocational programs compared to theoretical programs.22 A 
fourth possibility is of course that the effect of education is spurious and what matters 
are family background and the environment in which people grew up. This is an 
urgent question for forthcoming research to deal with; is it type of education that 
causes systematic differences in levels of democratic citizenship or is these effects 
consequences of the environment in which people grew up? If type of education 
matters, how and why does it matter? 
  The absent positive effects from the Swedish reform of the educational system 
in the 1990s may seem to be disappointing for policy makers in other countries 
hoping to improve citizen literacy, levels of participation, etc, by education reforms. 
How come our results differ so much from the previous research on effects of 
education? One explanation may be that most studies draw conclusions from cross 
sectional data. Unfortunately, there are only rare opportunities to study natural 
experiments like this. Our results show that one should be careful to not draw the 
conclusion that there is an obvious causal relationship between length of education 
and the amount of civics courses vis-à-vis the characteristics of democratic 
citizenship.  
 
22 Previous studies point out that the classroom climate on vocational programs generally is less open 
than on theoretical programs (Ekman 2007). 
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APPENDIX A: QUESTION WORDING AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTIONS 
All dependent variables have been coded so that they vary between 0-1. 1 indicates 
that respondents give a positive answer to all the questions included in the index (or 
all correct answers to the knowledge questions).  
 
Political participation  
Party activities (SCS): Is an additive index produced by three dichotomy questions: 
are you a member of any “party or political organization?”; “during the last year, 
have you participated in any political meeting?”; “during the last year, have you been 
working in a political party?”  
Contacting (SCS): Is an additive index produced by three dichotomy questions: There 
are different ways to try to make the society better or to counteract deterioration. 
Have you done any of the following during the last year: “contacting a politician?”; 
“contacting an association or organization?”; “contacting media?”, “contacting a civil 
servant in the state or municipality?” 
Manifestations (SCS): Is an additive index produced by six dichotomy questions 
concerning whether the respondent have done any of the following activities: “signed 
a list of signatures”, “wearing campaign symbols”, “participated in a demonstration”, 
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“participated in illegal protest activities”, “collecting money to any organization or 
boycotting any goods”. 
Voting (SNES): Consists of information from the electoral register concerning 
whether or not the respondents have been voting in the parliament (Riksdag) election. 
 Contacts (SNES): Is an additive index consisting of three questions (except for 
SNES 1994 which consists only of the two first questions): “During last year, have 
you been to any meeting or gathering where any member of the parliament has 
appeared?”, “During the last year, have you written letters or e-mail, or in any other 
way, tried to get in touch with any member of the parliament?”, “During the last year, 
have you visited any website belonging to a member of the parliament?”  
 
Political knowledge 
Political knowledge (SNES): Is an additive index based on five questions about 
Swedish politics and the political system. The index varies between 0 (0 right 
answers) and 1 (7 right answers).  
 The first political knowledge index – factual knowledge of current state-of-affairs 
and the political system – consists of eight questions concerning political events and 
the political system with true or false answers. 
 The second political knowledge index – factual knowledge of political 
representatives – is made up of a set of questions concerning knowledge about which 
party a set of political leaders represent. These politicians are not party leaders; 
however they have actively taken part in the political debate and have frequently been 
exposed to media coverage of Swedish politics.  
 
Political attentiveness 
Political attentiveness: Is an index consisting of three questions: “How much do you 
usually read of news and articles about politics in the newspapers?” Respondents 
choose one of four options: “1, I never read news and articles about politics. 2, I read 
news and articles about politics sometimes. 3, I often read news and articles about 
politics. 4. I read all there is of news and articles about politics in the newspaper 
every day.” The variable is recoded so that it varies between 0 and 1. Answer 1 is 
coded as 0 and answer 4 is coded as 1. The second question is: “How interested are 
you in general about politics? Are you very interested, fairly interested, not 
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particularly interested or not interested at all.” The variable is coded so that it varies 
between 1 (very interested) and 0 (not interested at all). The third question is: “How 
often do political discussions take place in your closest surroundings? Does it take 
place: very often, quite often, not very often or not at all?” The variable is coded so 
that it varies between 1 (very often) and 0 (not at all). The index variable is a mean 
calculated of the three single variables. 
 
Trust 
The two trust variables are collected from the SOM-surveys. The first one concern to 
what extent respondents trust Swedish politicians: “In general, how much trust do you 
have in Swedish politicians?” The respondents are asked to estimate their levels of 
trust on a four-graded scale. 
 The second question is about to what extent the respondent believes that one 
can trust other people in general: “In your opinion, to what extent can one trust people 
in general?” The respondents are asked to estimate their levels of trust on a scale from 
0-10. 0 represents “it is not possible to trust people in general” and 10 represents “it is 
possible to trust people in general”. The variable is recoded so that it varies between 0 
and 1. 
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